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MEMUKANDUM FUR: DDT

Attached is the draft summary of the S/P paper on How Things will Look in '65: (a) if present trends continue; and (b) if we do what we should. The purpose of this piece is obvious and, though it is no great shakes, it says the necessary things quite neatly. It is backed up by a whole series of staff papers I haven't seen.

Very wel done Both It.

1 JUN 1959 (DATE)

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON



SECRET

May 27, 1959

Dear Bob:

The enclosed S/P paper and a copy of a self-explanatory letter to Haydn Williams are for your personal information. Please return when you have read. I will look forward to hearing your views when next we meet on this subject.

Sincerely,

Howard Furnas Member, Policy Planning Staff

Enclosures:

- 1) Cy 9 of S/P Paper dated May 1959.
- 2) Letter to HWilliams dated 5/27/59.

Mr. Robert W. Komer,
Planning Board Assistant,
Central Intelligence Agency,
344 Administration Building,
2430 "E" Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

This document consists of ____ pages No.____ of ___ Copies, Series _____

SECRET

May 27, 1959

Dear Haydn:

I am enclosing a copy of the Policy Planning Staff paper "The World in 1965: Prospect versus Goals" which I mentioned to you the other day. Since the paper has not been shown to other parts of the Department, and, indeed, may not yet even represent a firm S/P position, I would appreciate your regarding it as for your personal information. It is only because of the importance of the problem which we have been discussing, and our agreement that we should not delay in attacking it, that I thought it might be useful for you at least to have an idea of our thoughts at this stage.

There are only two extra copies of the present paper and I am sending one to Bob Komer. Would you be kind enough to share yours with Chuck Triebel on a personal basis for him also? Perhaps at an early meeting the four of us can discuss the subject further.

Please return the enclosure when you and Chuck have read it.

Sincerely,

Howard Furnas Member, Policy Planning Staff

Enclosure:

S/P paper dated May 1959.

Mr. Haydn F. Williams,
Alternate Planning Board Member,
Department of Defense,
Room 3E 274 Pentagon.

29 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Komer

FROM : John W. Huizenga

SUBJECT : Comment on S/P Paper

l. General. My broadest impressions are a) that this is much too large a subject to bite off in this summary form, and b) that the prospects are not quite so unrelievedly gloomy as portrayed. On the latter point it could be argued: a) Communist influence in the underdeveloped areas has been in a honeymoon phase and its continuing expansion need not be assumed; b) the paper takes no account of difficulties which may arise for the Bloc internally.

2. Page 3. In the second paragraph on this page I would mention population pressures in certain areas as a principal factor contributing to revolutionary upheavals. The sentence about Communist ideology could be revised to say: "Communism, while in many ways bankrupt as an ideology, even in the USSR, remains the political doctrine which is most effective in utilizing mass discontent to create organized political power." The first sentence of the third paragraph should then be adapted: "Thus Communist imperialism could be the main beneficiary of the revolutionary ferment which we anticipate."

3. Page 5. I don't think Prospect b is reasonable. The more likely outlook is for the increasing invulnerability, in rough parallel, of the striking power of both sides, at least by 1965 and after.

- h. Page 9 (Prospect c). Bloc trade with some underdeveloped countries may grow, but the "penetration" in a political sense is likely to be much less than either we or the Soviets have anticipated.
- 5. Page 16. Refining to the second paragraph, it seems to me increasingly dubious that the Free World wants to be assured that we will actually use our nuclear capability in certain contingencies. What they want is assurance that we have enough and in the right form so that the Soviets won't be tempted to use their military power. The confidence of the Free World in the adequacy of our military posture will increasingly depend upon our capability to employ limited force in limited situations, as indeed the next paragraph goes on to say, though I think not forcefully enough.
- 6. Page 17, Paragraph 6. This sounds as though all we have to do is to allocate a little bit more out of a fixed pool of resources. The greatest weakness of this paper on the policy side seems to me to be the failure to stress the need to expand the resources available to us for all our national programs. More important then anything else is that we devise for ourselves what on p. 15 we are asked to provide for others, i.e., "bolder programs to assist economic growth."